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QNE OF THE MOST ABRUPT turnabouts in federal Indian 
policy occurred during the liberal era of 1933 to 1953, when 
the Harry S. Truman administration reversed the approach of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. The outlines of these contradictory 
policies emerged with unusual clarity during World War II in a 
clash over another ethnic minority, Japanese Americans. At 
issue in June 1942 was the sort of community to be encouraged 
at the Poston, Arizona, internment camp that the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs ran for the War Relocation Authority (WRA). 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier feared five or 
more years might elapse before the "bitter and shocking 
ordeal" of the Japanese Americans ended. He pledged that the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs would in the meantime encourage 
substantial self-government, cooperative economic enterprises, 
and traditional Japanese cultural activities. Collier hoped to 
make Poston a place where people would give themselves 
"utterly to the community" and provide for the rest of the 
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United States a "demonstration of the efficiency and the 
splendor of cooperative living. "1 
WRA Director Dillon S. Myer wanted to apply a uniform 
policy to all the camps, however, and by 1944 the BIA had 
turned its Poston experiment over to central WRA control. 
Myer circumscribed camp self-government, curtailed the 
co-ops, and discouraged Japanese cultural expressions. "Amer­
icanization can never be wholly effective within the confines of 
relocation centers," he argued. He intended to resettle the 
internees as quickly as possible, but not in their "little Tokyos. "  
"I have found no one who thought that these concentrations of 
populations were desirable even in peacetime," Myer said. The 
internees would be distributed widely across the country so 
that "they can be absorbed readily. "2  
As Roosevelt's commissioner of Indian affairs from 1933 
through 1945, Collier fostered traditional culture and com­
munity. As Truman's commissioner from 1950 to 1953, Myer 
promoted instead assimilation and individualism. Previous ac­
counts attribute the weakening of Collier's Indian New Deal 
from 1 945 to 1953 largely to conservative opposition in Con­
gress, and some date the reversal of his policy from the Dwight 
D. Eisenhower administration's adoption of termination in 
1 953. But it was the Truman administration that reversed the 
Indian New Deal as liberalism changed from supporting 
traditional community to finding community in the nation. 
Indian policy provides an especially good index of liberal 
values: In formulating policy for native American societies, 
mainstream Americans often reveal not so much their concern 
for Indian realities as their image of what society at large 
should be. The purpose of this article, then, is twofold: to chart 
'Collier address at Poston, June 27, 1942 ; Collier to John G. Evans, Jan. 19, 1944 ; 
Howard R. Stinson to Secretary of the Interior, July 6, 1943 ; "Community Enterprises 
Policy Statement and Criteria," n.d. (ca. June 1942) ; Wade Head to Dillon S. Myer, 
Dec. 13, 1943 ;  Collier to Secretary Ickes, Aug. 17, 1943, all in WRA folders, Collier 
Office File, Records of Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75, National Archives 
(hereafter cited as Collier Office File); Alexander H. Leighton, The Governing of Men: 
General Principles and Recommendations Based on Experience at a Japanese Relocation Camp 
(Princeton, N.J., 1945), 45-50, 61, 79, 103-104, ll0-120, 130. 
'Myer address to Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Aug. 1943 ; Head to Collier, 
Feb. 6, 1943 ;  Myer to all project directors, June 15, 1943, WRA folders, Collier Office 
File; Leighton, Governing of Men, 152-153; Myer, Uprooted Americans (Tucson, Ariz., 
1971), 61-62, 268. 
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the course of Indian policy from 1933 to 1953; and to use 
Indian policy, the epitome of the "community New Deal," to 
suggest some modifications in the interpretations of the con­
tinuity of liberali�m from the New Deal to the Fair Deal. 3 
By 1933 the continued existence of the Indian community 
had become problematic. For the previous half-century federal 
policy had driven towards assimilation-"Americanization"­
by eradicating Indian traits and merging Indians with society 
at large. The key to assimilation was individualization as 
embodied in the General Allotment Act (Dawes Severalty Act) 
of 1887, a reform measure that mandated the division of 
communally held lands among individual Indians. Private 
property, augmented by education, would free the Indian 
from the traditional community, "awaken in him wants," and 
make him a competitive individual citizen with full. legal 
3 In this paper I am considering liberalism chiefly in its political expressions of the 
New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Fair Deal of Harry S. Truman. Assimila­
tion I am considering as "such modifications as eliminate the characteristics of foreign 
origin" with the modifications being "made by the weaker or numerically inferior 
group." Henry Pratt Fairchild, ed., Dictionary of Sociology (New York, 1944), 276 - 277; 
see also Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and 
National Origins (New York, 1964), chap. 3. 
The fullest study of the termination period interprets liberals as responding largely 
to conservative initiative (Larry J. Hasse, "Termination and Assimilation: Federal 
Indian Policy, 1943 to 1961" [Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State University, 1974], 
50, 60, I 08, 122-125 ). Other studies that recognize a break with the Indian New Deal 
in the Truman period either emphasize the conservative drive or attribute the change 
in the executive branch largely to Myer. See William Brandon, The Last Americans (New 
York, 1974), 432; Angie Debo, A History of the Indians of the United States (Norman, Okla., 
1970), 303-304; Harold E. Fey and D'Arcy McNickle, Indians and Other Americans: Two 
Ways of Life Meet (New York, 1959), 134-135; Wilcomb E. Washburn, Red Man's 
Land/White Man's Law: A Study of the Past and Present Status of the American Indian (New 
York, 1971), 82-86 ; S. Lyman Tyler, A History of Indian Policy (Washington, D.C., 
1973), 136-186; William T. Hagan, AmerU:an Indians (Chicago, 1961), 161; William E. 
Zimmerman, "The Role of the Bureau of Indian Affairs since 1933," Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXI ( 1957), 34; Donald R. McCoy and 
Richard T. Ruetten, Quest and Response: The Truman Administration and Minority Rights 
(Lawrence, Kan., 1973), 302-306. Some studies see little break until the Dwight Eisen­
hower administration. See Gary Orfield, "A Study of the Termination Policy," in Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Indian Education, "The 
Education of American Indians: The Organization Question," Committee Print, 91 
Cong., 1 sess., (1969), 673-817; Kenneth R. Philp, "John Collier and the American 
Indian," in Leon Borden Blair, ed., Essays on Radicalism in Contemporary America (Austin, 
Tex., 1972), 79 ; Carl N. Degler, "Indians and Other Americans," Commentary, LIV, 
(Nov. 1972), 71; Nancy Oestreich Lurie, "Menominee Termination," Indian Historian, 
IV (Winter 1971), 33, 36.  Felix Cohen, who was well aware of the reversal in policy, 
stressed bureaucracy in "The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953," Yale Law Journal, 
LXII (1953), 348. 
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equality. The policy backfired disastrously. By 1933 the In­
dians had lost two-thirds of their land, and had allotment con­
tinued for another generation, Indians would have been 
virtually landless. The loss of land, augmented by arbitrary 
and minute BIA controls, sapped the life of many once vital 
Indian communities. Individualization had undermined com­
munity but put little in the community's place.4 
The allotment policy seemed to John Collier a microcosm of 
Western civilization since the eighteenth century. The Indus­
trial Revolution and nineteenth-century thought had shattered 
community, he felt, and produced instead an aggregation of 
isolated, mobile, economically motivated individuals. Man was 
divorced from nature: human actions were explained by 
mechanical rectilinear constructs, and economic activity threat­
ened to destroy nature itself. The diversity and freedom bred 
by many small communities were replaced by the "pulverizing 
uniformities" of the free market and the "denaturing uni­
formities" of the state. These atomistic tendencies produced 
the hallmarks of mass society-conformity and alienation. 
Collier's social theory, which closely resembled Ferdinand 
Tonnies's classic spheres of Gemeinschaft (community) and 
Gesellschaft (society), undoubtedly applied the dichotomy too 
sharply. Yet in posing alternative ideal types he called attention 
to some of the severe problems of modern society and the need 
for a better balance among individual, community, and society.5 
'Address by Merrill E. Gates, president of Amherst College, to Lake Mohonk 
Conference of Friends of the Indian, 1896, in Francis Paul Prucha, ed . ,  Americanizing 
the American Indians: Writing by the "Frieruls of the Indian," 1880-1900 (Cambridge, 
Mass. ,  1973), 334; see also Prucha's introduction, esp. pp. 6-8; William T. Hagan, 
"Private Property: The Indian's Door to Civilization," Ethnohistory, III (1956), 126-
137; Henry E.  Fritz, The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890 (Philadelphia, 
1963); Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (Washington, D.C. ,  1942; rpt . ,  
Albuquerque, N . M . ,  1971), 216; Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Indian in America (New 
York, 1975), chap. 11. 
•john Collier, Indians of the Americas (New York, abridged ed., 1948), 7-16, 20-24; 
Collier, From Every Zenith (Denver, 1963), 10-12, 93-94, 466-467; Ferdinand 
Tonnies, trans. by Charles P.  Loomis, Community & Society: Gemeinschaft und Gesell­
schaft (East Lansing, Mich . ,  1957), esp. 33-39. The standard work on Collier's career is 
Kenneth R. Philp, John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, 1920-1954 (Tucson, Ariz. ,  
1977); on t h e  future commissioner's early life and thought, see pp. 7-22. Also helpful 
in u nderstanding Collier's intellectual development are Jessie Bernard, The Sociology of 
Community (Glenview, Ill . ,  1973). 4, 6-7, 91-120; Stephen J. Kunitz, "The Social 
Philosophy of John Collier," Ethnohistory, XVIII (1971), 213-229; and Kunitz, "Equi­
librium Theory in Social Psychiatry: The Work of the Leightons," Psychiatry, XXXIll  
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Collier, who combined mysticism, social-science understand­
ing, and political and administrative shrewdness, devoted his 
life to rebuilding community. As a settlement-house worker in 
New York City from 1907 to 19 19 he strove, like many other 
social-justice progressives, to preserve the culture of ethnic 
groups and to maintain a community sense among immigrants. 
After World War I, disillusioned and under surveillance by 
Justice Department agents for his "subversive" beliefs, he paid 
a chance visit to the Taos pueblo in New Mexico. There he 
found a community such as he thought had vanished, but 
which offered "gifts without price" that "the world must have 
again, lest it die." The Indians' organic community was not 
isolated in time nor divorced from nature but united with past 
and future in ecological harmony. Nor was the Indian com­
munity static ; it showed remarkable adaptability. The group 
shaped individual personalities and placed them in touch with 
the spiritual. Yet the individual did not lose his identity: There 
remained a perimeter of freedom and autonomy-even idio­
syncracy-around each person. Because of its intensity, the 
primary group as experienced by one of its members could be 
more complex and diverse than an entire nation as expe­
rienced by one of its citizens. 6 
(1970), 312-328. Kunitz suggests that the Gemeinschaft ideal reflected a conservative 
response by status-anxious individuals who were upset by the Industrial Revolution and 
saw community as a way of staving off class conflict ("Social Philosophy of John Collier ,"  
215, 223-224, 226, and "Equilibrium Theory," 312, 315-316, 320). While community 
may be turned to conservative uses, i t  may also be grafted to radical theory, as Kunitz at 
one point concedes ("Social Philosophy," 226). Collier was initially impressed by the 
Communist Revolution in  Russia and after World War II was sympathetic to the Third 
World and certain aspects of the People's Republic of China (From Every Zenith, 12, 
117-119, 390-403). Collier does not stress class conflict, probably because of his 
essentially non-materialistic values. On individualism and community, see also Don E. 
Fehrenbacher, ed. , History and American Society: Essays of David M. Potter (New York, 
1973), 319, 331-333;  Robert A. Nisbet, The Quest for Community (2nd ed. ,  New York, 
1969), 129-188; and Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in America 
( Berkeley, 1973), chap. iv. 
•collier ,  Indians of the Americas, 7-16, 20-24; Collier, From Every Zenith, 68-94, 
117-119; Collier, 'The Red Atlantis," Survey, l L  (Oct. 1 ,  1922), 15-19, 62-63 ; Collier, 
" M exico: A C hallenge," Progressive Education, IX (Feb. 1932), 95-98; Collier, "Needs in 
Administration of Indian Property ," in Proceedings of the National Conference of Social 
Work (Chicago, 1932), 627-639; Philp ,  John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, 2-3 ; 
Clarke A. Chambers, Seedtime of Reform: American Social Service and Social Action, 1918-
1933 (Minneapolis, 1963), 111-112; Jane Addams, Twenty Years at Hull-House 
( N ew York, 1961), 75-76, 105-106, 109-110, 169-185; Morton and Lucia White, 
The Intellectual versus the City: From Thomas Jefferson to Frank Lloyd Wright (Cambridge , 
Mass . ,  1962), 150, 161, 170-176. 
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The one gift whites could give Indians-continued exis­
tence-became Collier's passion. He sought first to reverse the 
allotment policy, for it was "chiefly .. . 'Americanization' which 
beats down and drives underground the community life." 
During the 1920s he battled in the forefront of the Indian 
rights movement for Indian religious freedom and preserva­
tion of the Pueblo lands. When the seedtime of reform blos­
somed into harvest in 1933 Collier had his chance to encourage 
the "cooperative community action" he had admired in the 
indigenist revival in Mexico. 7 
The native communities of the Southwest and Mexico had a 
particular appeal for many artists and intellectuals of the 1920s 
and 1930s who pondered the relationship of the individual to 
mass society. Figures as diverse as Joseph Wood Krutch, Lewis 
Mumford, Ruth Benedict, Mary Austin, Oliver Lafarge, Stuart 
Chase, D. H.  Lawrence, and John Dewey were deeply im­
pressed by the native peoples' spiritual, nonmaterialistic, com­
munal lives. These communities seemed to offer a means of 
retaining some of the best qualities of liberalism while recon­
ciling individualism with collectivism. These thinkers hoped to 
transplant some of the best qualities of Robert Redfield's Mexi­
can village Tepoztlan to Robert and Helen Lynd's Middletown.8 
During the "collectivist" phase of Roosevelt's first term, Collier 
and other officials sensed a unique opportunity to implement 
7Collier, "The Red Atlantis," 62; Philp .john Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, chaps. 
2-5; Randolph C. Downes, "A Crusade for Indian Reform, 1 922- 1 934," Mi1sissippi 
Valley Historical Review, XXXV (1945), 334-345; Lawrence C. Kelly, "Choosing the 
New Deal Indian Commissioner: Ickes vs. Collier," New Mexico Historical Review, XLIX 
( 1974), 268-288; Collier, From Every Zenith, 293-299; Ickes to Collier, Feb. 22, 1 934, 
box 5, Ickes Office Files, Records of the Ofhce of the Secretary of the Interior, Record 
Group 48, National Archives. 
8 Richard H. Pelis, Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the 
Depression Years (New York, 1 973), chap. 3, esp. pp. 1 0 1 - 1 2 1 ;  D. H. Lawrence, "New 
Mexico," in Phoenix (New York, 19'.l6), 142; Mary Austin, Earth.f:lorizon: Autobiography 
(New York, l 9'.32), esp. 365-368; Stuart Chase, Mexico: A Study of Two Americas (New 
York, 1931), esp. 3 1 8-325; John Dewey, Impressions of Soviet Russia and the Revolu­
tionary World: Mexico-China-Turkey (New York, 1 929; rpt. 1 932), 1 53- 1 67;  D'Arcy 
McNickle, Indian Man: A Life of Oliver Laforge ( Bloomington, Ind., 1 97 1 ); Van Wyck 
Brooks, ThP Confident Years: 1885-1915 (New York, 1952), 357-370; R. Alan Lawson, 
The Failure of"Ir{dependent Liberalism, 1930-1941 (New York, 197 1), IO:l, 1 09, 1 12, 12G, 
130, 133-134, 1 50- 1 55, 183 ; E!emire Zolla, trans. by Raymond Rosenthal, The Writer 
and the Shaman: A Morphology of the Amnican Indian (New York, 1 973), chaps. 9- 1 O; for 
the continuing relevance and appeal of the communities of the Southwest and Mexico, 
see F.S.C. Northrop, MeetingofEn.1t and West(New York, 1946), esp. chap. 2; and Vincent. 
Scully, Pueblo : Mountain/Village/Dance (New York, 1975). 
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what might be termed the "community New Deal." These pro­
grams transcended mere economic interest groupings, and their 
collective action attempted to forge bonds among individuals 
on a basis of shared values, usually at the local level. Cooperation 
would replace competition, especially in economic activities; 
people would involve themselves deeply in group life and self­
government; and indigenous arts and crafts would flourish. The 
Resettlement Administration of Rexford G. Tugwell and M. L. 
Wilson-and its successor, the Farm Security Administration­
sponsored community centers, communal farms, and green­
belt towns. Arthur E. Morgan tried to preserve the community­
planning potential of the Tennessee Valley Authority against 
the power-oriented ambitions of David Lilienthal. The Civilian 
Conservation Corps not merely gave work to youths but 
fostered group life. Group solidarity, grass-roots participation, 
and a community aesthetic suffused the Federal Theatre 
Program, Federal Writers Project, and Federal Arts Project. 9 
The community emphasis was not synonymous with the 
New Deal as a whole, many aspects of which carried on indi­
vidualistic and traditional ideas. The community New Deal 
"Paul Conkin, Tomorrow a New World: The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1959), esp. 1 07, 1 92- 1 93, 203-2 1 1 ,  226-227, 267, 329-33 1 ;  Otis L. Graham, Jr., 
Toward a Planned Society: From Roosevelt to Nixon (New York, 1 976), 1 9-2 1 ,  103. More 
conventional liberal interpretations of the New Deal have largely overlooked the com­
munity emphasis by stressing the New Deal's pragmatic, nonmoralistic temper (e.g., 
Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform [New York, 1 955], esp. 3 1 6-3 1 8, 325). 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., shows little sympathy for the community New Dealers (The 
Age of Roosevelt, Vol. 2: The Coming of the New Deal [ Boston, 1 958], 37 1 -373; and Vol 3: 
The Politics of Upheaval [ Boston, 1 960], chap. 20). William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York, 1 963) is more sympathetic but 
dubious about the effects of the programs (pp. 1 40- 1 4 1 ,  1 65- 166); he discusses the 
Indian New Deal in the context of procedural reform and the broker state (pp. 85-86). 
Tugwell discusses the split between "collectivism" and "atomism" in The Democratic 
Roosevelt (Garden City, N.Y., 1 957), 2 1 8-229, 328-329, 545-547. On specific persons 
and programs, see Sidney Baldwin, Poverty and Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Farm 
Security Administration (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1 968), esp. 203-208 ; Edward C. Banfield, 
Government Project (Glencoe, Ill., 1 95 1  ), esp. chaps. 2, 1 4, and 1 5, and the foreword by 
Tugwell, esp. p. 1 2; Walter J. Stein, California and the Dust Bowl Migration (Westport, 
Conn., 1973), chap. 6; Thomas K. McCraw, Morgan vs. Lilienthal: The Feud within the
TVA (Chicago, 1 970), I 0- 1 l ,  '.33-36 ;  John A. Salmond, The Civilian Conservation Corps, 
1933-1942: A New Deal Case Study (Durham, N.C., 1 967), 1 32, 144; Richard S. 
Kirkendall, Social Scientists arul Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt (Columbia, Mo., 1966), 
1 1 2- 1 1 3, 1 29- 130; Pelis, Radical Visions and American Dreams, 258; Orlando W. Miller, 
The Frontier in Alaska and the Matanuska Colony (New Haven, 1 975), 36-37, 1 06- l07, 
136-143; and Jane De Hart Mathews, "Arts and the People: The New Deal Quest for a 
Cultural Democracy," Journal of American History, LXll ( 1975), 3 1 8, 323, 3 3 1 .  
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remained chiefly the domain of second-level officials, but it 
attracted support among the administration's high command. 
Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, who had a keen 
appreciation of Indian spiritual life, shared some of the 
community vision. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, a 
veteran of the settlement-house, conservation, and Indian­
rights movements, placed support of the Indian New Deal and 
a balanced conservation program of both use and preservation 
among his primary objectives. President Roosevelt's life-long 
devotion to conservation, "so nourishing to the impulse to see 
things in their total web of relationships," made FDR what 
Otis L. Graham, Jr., has termed an "instinctive collectivist" 
with an organic view of society. The importance of the com­
munity New Deal transcended the number of programs and 
their degree of success. The community programs became a 
focal point of ideological conflict. The very term "community" 
became, as Paul Conkin has noted, an antonym of individ­
ualism and a symbol of a new organic vision of society. The 
community New Deal thus represented more than a political 
program; it was also an intellectual and cultural challenge to 
the older liberalism. 1 0  
Collier's Indian New Deal represented the fullest expression 
of the community ideal, for it tried to unite ethnic identity, 
collective land management, and group self-government into a 
functional whole. His draft legislation was sweeping. Since 
land ownership was central to Indian affairs, Collier proposed 
a package designed to end allotment, return fractionated 
allotments to the tribe, and add land to the tribal estate. To 
encourage community self-government the draft provided for 
the organization of tribal governments with all powers typical 
of municipa[ corporations, for specific authority to delegate all 
BIA functions to the tribes, and for limitations on federal 
interference in tribal affairs. An Indian court would apply 
1°Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol . 4: Launching the New Deal (Boston, 1973), 
78, 80-81, 255-266, 351; McCraw, Morgan vs. Lilienthal, 33-36; Norman D. Mark­
owtiz, The Rise and Fall of the Peuple"s Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 
1941-1948 (New York, 1973), 1-2; Elmo Richardson, Dams, Parks & Politics: Resource 
Development and Preseroation in the Truman-Eisenhower Era (Lexington, Ky., 1973), 6-8;  
Linda Lear, "The Aggressive Progressive: The Political Career of Harold L. Ickes, 
1874-1933" (Ph.D.  dissertation,  George Washington University, 1974), 239-242; 
Collier to Wallace, Feb. 27, 1934, box 19, Collier Papers, Yale University Library. 
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traditional Indian concepts of justice. A revolving credit fund 
would facilitate community economic development. Finally, 
one section endorsed the furtherance of Indian culture. "Great 
stuff," Roosevelt scrawled on the draft.1 1  
Congress was willing to go only part way. As passed in June 
1 934 the Indian Reorganization Act was limited to those tribes 
in which a majority of members voted to accept; it exempted 
Oklahoma from its provisions. Congress eliminated the en­
dorsement of Indian cultural preservation and the Indian 
court. The IRA halted almost entirely the allotment process 
and authorized $2 million per year for tribal land acquisition. 
But to Collier's chagrin the act eliminated the authority to 
consolidate fractionated allotments, which would have re­
turned millions of the best acres to tribal ownership. Land 
assumed particular importance for Collier not merely because 
of its economic value but because it secured the geographic 
base he considered necessary for community .1 2 
The self-government provisions were a shadow of their 
original form. The IRA allowed tribes to organize tribal 
councils, draft a constitution, organize as business corpora­
tions, and tap the credit fund. There was little new in these 
provisions; some tribes already exercised some self-govern­
ment, and the IRA added nothing to the tribes' inherent 
powers of self-government. The sections that required the 
transfer of certain federal powers to the tribes were elimi­
nated; these remained the "uncontrolled discretion of the sec­
retary of the interior." In fact the tribal constitutions usu­
ally gave the agency superintendent or the Secretary of the 
11Collier to Ickes, Feb. 24, 1934, box 11; drafts of bills, box 23, Collier Papers ; Philp, 
John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, chap. 7; Lawrence C. Kelly , "The Indian 
Reorganization Act: The Dream and the Reality," Pacific Historical Review, XUV 
(1975), 293-296. Collier denied that his policy amounted to a "glass case"' or "back to 
the blanket" philosophy. He stressed the adoption of modern ways to bolster com­
m unity l ife on the reservation, and he clearly favored Indians remaining there; but he 
also wanted to equip Indians to enter competitive white society, if they so chose. 
Zimmerman, "The Role of the Bureau of Indian Affairs," 34; Collier. From Every Zenith, 
199, 203 .  
12 "Major Provisions of Original Wheeler-Howard Bill Omitted from Bill as Passed," 
n .d. (ca. June 1934), box 23, Collier Papers ; Collier, Indians of the Americas, 157-158; 
Kelly, " Indian Reorganization Act," 296-298; Kenneth Philp, "John Collier and the 
Controversy over the Wheeler-Howard Bill," in Jane F. Smith and Robert M .  
Kvasnicka, eds. , Indian-White Relations: A Persistent Paradox (Washington, D .C . ,  1976), 
171-200. 
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Interior a veto over the tribal council's acts. The principal ad­
vantage a tribe derived from the IRA government provisions 
was that, once adopted, a constitution could be changed only with 
the consent of the tribe or by act of Congress. 1 3 
Congress's part-way measures proved enough for Collier. 
Indeed, as Lawrence C. Kelly has noted, the commissioner 
acted as if Congress had approved his original draft. 1 4 Perhaps 
more than ahy other federal activity, Indian affairs are de­
termined more by administration than legislation. The IRA 
was the legislative cornerstone, but the Indian New Deal edifice 
more nearly resembled Collier's blueprint. 
Collier and Ickes used their vast administrative powers to 
extend the Indian New Deal to most of the tribes, regardless of 
whether they voted to accept the organizational structures of 
the IRA. Though Congress had struck the cultural sections, 
Collier made preservation of Indian culture one of his first 
objectives. He created an Indian Arts and Crafts Board. He 
guaranteed freedom for traditional Indian religion, ending the 
preferred position of Christian missionaries, who had of ten 
been the advance guard of individualism and assimilation. His 
director of education, John Dewey-influenced Willard Beatty, 
promoted Indian culture in the schools, began to replace 
boarding schools with day schools, and tried to broaden schools 
13Ibid.; Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 122, 129- 133. Lawrence C. Kelly has 
called attention to the confusion surrounding the number of tribes that came under the 
I RA. If the 99 small California bands, which Kelly rightly argues distort the tabulations, 
are excluded, the final figures appear to be 120 tribes accepting the IRA and 33 
opposing, or 77.7 percent in favor (Kelly, "Indian Reorganization Act," 302- 304). The
reasons why tribes voted against the I RA varied considerably and often had little to do 
with the act itself; the N avajo, for instance, turned down the act by a narrow margin, 
apparently because they associated it with the stock-reduction program (Donald L. 
Parman, The Navajos and the New Deal [New Haven, 1976], 77). Moreover, some tribes, 
such as those in New York, voted against the I RA but nonetheless opposed assimi­
lationist legislation in the early 1950s (Wilcomb E. Washburn, ed., The American Indian 
and the United States: A Documentary History [4 vols., New York, 1973], I I I , 2011-2023). 
I t  is, therefore, misleading to interpret a vote against the I RA as indicating a desire to 
"spurn" Collier's program (Kelly, " I ndian Reorganization Act," 305), especially since 
the act was but a part of his overall policy. Nor does the failure of a number of tribes 
who came under I RA to incorporate for business purposes seem especially telling. The 
loan fund was a small part even of IRA, and the paltry $5 million that Congress 
appropriated for it-compared to $72 million for the I ndian CCG-prnbably dis­
couraged incorporation .  See Donald Parman, "The I ndian and the Civilian Conserva­
tion Corps," Pacific Historical Review, XU (1971), 54. 
14Collier, Indians of the Americas, 155; Kelly, " Indian Reorganization Act," 298. 
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into community centers. To maintain the Indian's close rela­
tionship with nature, Collier established wilderness areas on 
several reservations. 15 
Collier's ideal was indirect administration: The BIA would 
outline broad policies, grant power and funds to the local com­
munity, and then allow each group to devise indigenous means 
of implementation. He curbed the powers of bureau agents, 
who had held virtually "every arbitrary power short of the 
right to slay," and he usually scrupulously observed Indian 
rights. Towards the end of his term he was considering 
abolishing some superintendencies altogether and having 
whites perform solely advisory functions. Secretary Ickes 
vetoed very few acts of tribal councils, and most of those were 
ordinances contravening federal statutes. Tribal courts began 
to function, staffed by native judges. Land allotments all but 
ceased, even on non-IRA reservations. Guided by Assistant 
Solicitor Felix Cohen, the bureau scored some notable ad­
vances in Indian legal rights, especially in winning Supreme 
Court recognition of native possessory title. 1 6
Mixed with these successes were serious problems. Congress 
appropriated only half the $10 million authorized for the 
credit fund. Only $5,075,000 was forthcoming for land acqui­
sition, although the National Resources Board estimated that 
$ 12 0  million was needed to raise Indian living standards to 
those of their white neighbors, which often approximated 
rural poverty. Administrative difficulties troubled Collier. 
Many veteran civil servants resisted his ideas, and policy suf­
fered the inevitable bureaucratic slippage. The commissioner 
sometimes negated his expressed objectives, as when he resorted 
15Collier, From Every Zenith, 168- 203, 269- 284; Philp ,John Collier's Crusade for Indian 
Reform, 184 - 185; Margaret Szasz, Education and the American Indian: The Road to Self 
Determination, I928-I973 ( Albuquerque, N . M., 1974), 48 - 55; Lawrence C. Kelly, The 
Navajo Indians and Federal Indian Policy (Tucson, Ariz. , 1968), 170; address by W .  Carson 
Ryan to N ational Conference of Social Workers, Kansas City, May 25, 1934, Collier Office 
File; "Wilderness Areas on I ndian Lands," box 79, Collier Papers. 
16Collier, " Red Atlantis," 19; Collier, Fram Every Zenith, 345 - 346; Cohen, Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law, 107 - 108, 130; United States as Guardian of the Hualpai Indians of 
Arizona v .  Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); Ward Shepard to Com­
missioner.June 17, 1942, box 19; W. V. Woehlke to Commissioner, Dec. 3, 1942, box 24, 
Collier PapeJ"s . 
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to coercion in the face of Navajo opposition to his stock­
reduction program. 17 
But perhaps Collier's most serious failure lay in his expec­
tation that the tribal council would foster community solidarity. 
The tribal council often introduced formal Anglo-Saxon ma­
joritarian procedures in place of the Indian's consensus­
oriented forms and imposed a divorce between church and 
state that was foreign to Indian theocratic governments. In 
some cases the more assimilated tribesmen captured the gov­
ernmental machinery, exacerbating factionalism. Community 
spirit flowered best among the tribes of the Southwest, whose 
lands had remained largely intact. On the Great Plains, and 
particularly in Oklahoma, where allotment had advanced fur­
thest, recreation of the community proved difficult. 18 
Critics charged that the Indian New Deal, like the com­
munity New Deal at large, was tender-minded or idealistic. But 
the supposedly utopian Farm Security Administration fright­
ened vested agricultural interests into opposition, and Collier 
presented ample evidence to prove his policy's realism. Under 
his regime the Indian land base had been stabilized, and 
through the use of the CCC and other funds, the land had 
been put into its best condition in recent history; blinding 
trachoma had been wiped out in large blocs of Indian country; 
and the Indian death rate had been halved. Collier had 
i7Kelly, "Indian Reorganization Act," 306-309; E. R. Fryer to Collier, Feb. 18, 1941, 
and other correspondence on N avajo affairs, Navajo folders, Collier Office File;  Kelly, 
Navajo Indians and Federal Indian Policy, chap. 9;  David F. Aberle, The Peyote Religion 
among the Navajo (Chicago, 1966), 52-90;James F. Downs, Animal Husbandry in Navajo 
Society and Culture (Berkeley, 1964), esp. 18-22; George A. Boyce, When Navajos Had 
Too Many Sheep: The 1940's (San Francisco, 1974), 54-55, 69; Graham D. Taylor, 
"Anthropologists, Reformers, and the Indian· New Deal," PrologtUJ, Vil ( l 975), l 5 l -
162; Peter Iverson, "The Evolving Navajo Nation: Dine Continuity within Change" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975), 63-81; Ruth Roessel and Brod­
erick H. Johnson, compilers, Navajo Livestock Reduction: A National Disgrace (Chinle, 
A riz., 1974). 
'"Graham D. Taylor, "The Tribal Alternative to Bureaucracy: The I ndian's New 
Deal, 1933-1945," journal of the West, XI I I  (1974), 128-142; Kelly, "I ndian Re­
organization Act," 309-3 l l; Philp, john Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, l 86; Gott­
fried Otto Lang, "The Ute Development Program: A SlUdy in Culture Change in an 
Underdeveloped Area within the United States" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell Uni­
versity, 1954), 112- l l 4, 383-385; Joseph C. Jorgensen, The Sun Dance Religion: Power 
for the Powerless (Chicago, 1972), 98-100, 139; Nancy Lurie, "The Contemporary 
A merican Indian Scene," in Eleanor Burke Leacock and N ancy Lurie, eds., North 
American Indians in Historical Perspective (New York, 1971), 437-438. 
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achieved the first part of his dream-guaranteeing the Indian 
community continued existence. But more than that, his ad­
ministration had been instrumental in reviving Indian hope 
and pride so that even so severe a critic of federal policy as 
Vine Deloria, Jr. , termed the 1930s "the greatest days of 
Indian life in the twentieth century . " 19 
Collier's nearly twelve years as commissioner-the longest 
in the history of the office-had been only a start. His admin­
istration, he recognized, had met the Indians' immense prob­
lems only "in spirit and by intention. " During Roosevelt's 
second term, shifting political and intellectual trends had 
begun to undermine the Indian New Deal. In 1937 Democratic 
Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana repudiated his spon­
sorship of the Indian Reorganization Act, denounced Collier, 
and returned to his earlier belief in assimilation. Wheeler's 
defection foreshadowed the conservative resurgence, which 
particularly attacked the community New Deal programs for 
their lack of private property and their supposed resemblance 
to the collectivist programs of the Soviet Union. The totali­
tarian example, left and right, led many liberals, radicals, and 
intellectuals to reassert the individual against the community. 
National unity became increasingly important, and cultural · 
pluralism seemed divisive as intellectuals and politicians stressed 
the similarities that united Americans. As community and 
ethnicity both grew suspect, Collier found it increasingly diffi­
cult to maintain a program fusing the two ideals.20 
American entry into World War II sharply accelerated the 
community New Deal's slide. Most of its programs were 
emasculated or dropped altogether. The Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, deemed a "nonessential" wartime agency, was exiled 
from Washington to the Merchandise Mart in Chicago; most of 
19Jennings C. Wise, Red Man in the New World Drama, ed. by Vine Deloria, Jr. (New 
York, 1971), 360; Collier, Indians of the Americas, 159; Parma n, ''The Indian and the 
Civilian Conservation Corps," 54; Hazel W. Hertzberg, The Search for an American Indian 
Identity: Modem Pan-Indian Movements (Syracuse, N.Y., 1971), 287-290. 
••collier, Indians of the Americas, 164; Philp, "John Collier and the American Indian,
1920-1945" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1968), 215-217, 220; 
Pelis, Radical Visions and American Dreams, 346-362; Lawson, Failure of Independent 
Liberalism, 231, 246, 254; James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New 
Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939 (Lexington, Ky., 
1967), 115-119. 
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the bureau's best young talent was drained into the military; 
deep budget cuts curtailed vital services. The conservative 
attack in Congress was partly to blame; by 1944 the House 
Committee on Indian Affairs was calling for repeal of the IRA 
and a return to individual land holding and assimilation. But 
liberals also were falling away from their positions of the 1930s. 
At the Interior Department's institute on postwar resources in 
late 1945 strong sentiment surfaced for abandoning the com­
munity-oriented programs. Departmental participants empha­
sized the need to reduce federal obligations, impose the 
"interests of the Nation upon the Indians," and equip them 
"for ultimate integration into society." Liberals in the Bureau 
of the Budget in 1944-1945 likewise emphasized economy 
and assimilation. When Collier left office at the end of 1945 
and Ickes fell out of the Cabinet six weeks later, the Indian 
New Deal was in disorderly retreat.21 
The years 1946 through 1949 were characterized by drift. 
The attack in Congress mounted as conservatives applied a 
familiar array of arguments to Indian affairs: federal respon­
sibilities should be handed over to the states; welfare programs 
encouraged shiftlessness; the BIA should trim its programs to 
help balance the budget; federal regulations hamstrung indi­
vidual freedom. The community emphasis seemed especially 
sinister.·· Republican Senator George "Molly" Malone of Ne­
vada exclaimed: "While we are spending billions of dollars 
fighting Communism . . . we are at the same time . .. per­
petuating the systems of Indian reservations and tribal govern­
ments, which are natural Socialist environments." The number 
of bills to force the Secretary of the Interior to split up tribal 
lands rose sharply, and a number of bills proposed rapid 
dissolution of the BIA.22 
21Evelyn Cooper to C. Girard Davidson, April 30, 1946, box 79, Joel D. Wolfsohn 
Files, Records of the General Land Office, Record Group 49, National Archives; Collier 
to Flickinger, Nov. 23, 1944, box 24, Collier Papers; Oscar L. Chapman to Secretary of 
the Interior, Ocl. 23, 1943, box 67, Chapman Papers; Baldwin, Poverty arul Politics, 
chaps. 11-12; Conkin, Torrwrrow a New World, chap. 9; Hasse, "Termination and 
Assimilation," 41-57; Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 19./1-
1945 (Philadelphia, 1972), chap. 3. 
22A. J. Liebling, 'The Lake of the Cui-ui Eaters-IV," New Yorker, XXX Uan. 22, 
1955), 68; Hasse, "Termination and Ass imilatio n , " 69-87, 90; Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1949 (Washington, D.C., 1949), 379-385. 
From New Deal to Termination 557 
The executive branch, lacking leadership in Indian affairs, 
had neither the will nor the vision to mount a counter­
offensive. President Harry S. Truman, though willing to veto 
the most vicious Indian bills, had little interest in Indian affairs 
or the community New Deal. Julius A. "Cap" Krug, a protege 
of David Lilienthal and Bernard Baruch and former head of 
the War Production Board, succeeded Ickes. Krug knew little 
about Indian affairs and exhibited a limp hand in depart­
mental matters generally. Collier's handpicked successor, New 
Mexico attorney William A. Brophy, showed promise but fell ill 
soon after assuming office in 1946. As acting commissioner, 
William E. Zimmerman, nominally Collier's second-in-com­
mand, did little more than keep the office open from mid-1946 
to early 1949. Sponsored by New Mexico's proassimilation 
senator, Clinton Anderson, John R. Nichols, president of New 
Mexico A&M, became commissioner in spring 1949. But 
Nichols, whom Krug considered one of the few people who 
knew something about Indians but "still isn't a screwball," 
spent most of his time on reservation inspection tours and left 
little imprint on policy. During this parade of commissioners, 
bureau morale plummeted and the barnacles of bureaucracy 
accumulated. Felix Cohen, feeling a "sense of repression," 
resigned in December 1947. A. L. Wathen, veteran head of the 
bureau's engineering branch, complained that no one knew 
what policy was. The bureau's "negativism, defeatism, and 
non-feasance" angered nearly everyone connected with Indian 
affairs and made defining a policy and reinvigorating the BIA 
of utmost importance.23 
As policy drifted within the bureau, assimilation increasingly 
was mixed with laudable goals. The BIA and the Interior 
Department endorsed the Indian Claims Commission Act 
of 1946 as elementary justice for the Indians, but they 
also approved the measure's per capita money compensation 
23Clayton R. Koppes, "Oscar L. Chapman: A Liberal at the Interior Department,
1933-1953" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 1974), 33-54; transcript of 
telephone conversation between Krug and Anderson, March 4, 1949, box 50, Krug 
Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division; Cohen to Brophy, Dec. 5, 1947, box 
16, Brophy Papers, Tru man Library; Wathen to Will iam E. Warne, Nov. 12, 1947, File 
5-11, RG 48, NA; Oliver La Farge, "Restatement of Program and Policy in Indian 
Affairs," Feb. 8, 1950, box 76, Philleo Nash Files, Harry S. Truman Papers, Truman
Library. 
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instead of restoration of land to tribal control. And the act 
probably could not have been passed without the support of 
assimilationists in Congress, who saw a final settlement of 
claims as a step to ending Indians' special status entirely. In 
l 94 7 the Department of the Interior worked closely with the 
Justice Department in the successful effort to have restricted 
housing convenants declared unconstitutional. Not only were 
these clauses unjust, they also discouraged Indians from mov­
ing off the reservations to look for work. Education lost much 
of its Indian emphasis. "The basic purpose of the Federal edu­
cation program," said Interior Under Secretary Oscar L. Chap­
man in 1948, "is to assist the Indians in understanding, accept­
ing and adjusting to the culture of the white man." Teachers 
were instructed to stress that when Indians left school they 
would be "required to compete with their white neighbors in 
every respect."24 
After Truman won office in his own right in 1948 the liberal 
assimilationist trend gathered force, for it proved to be a 
logical application of his Fair Deal. The Fair Deal attempted to 
expand some of the New Deal social-welfare programs, but its 
distinctive approach lay in economic growth and civil rights. "A 
great, continuing expansion in our domestic economy . . .  is 
the very essence of our development as a Nation," Chapman 
averred. Fair Dealers believed that an expanding capitalist 
economy would provide enough job opportunities so that each 
individual would attain prosperity through his own competi­
tive efforts; government-mandated income redistribution 
would be unnecessary. Since 1948 the Truman administration 
had moved toward the "integration of all minority groups," 
Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten have pointed out. 
The struggle for civil rights expressed a sincere desire to end 
discrimination; it was also a logical development in the liberal 
tradition of freeing the individual from supposedly invidious 
group identity, especially that of race, so that he or she could 
compete freely and form associations voluntarily in the great 
society.2s
24Chapman to Fred G. Gurley , Oct. 26, 1948, box 1 1  O; Chapman to Attorney General, 
Sept. 11, 1947, box 107, Chapman Papers ; Koppes, "Oscar L. Chapman," 34-35; 
Hagan, American Indians, 167. 
.. Koppes, "Oscar L. Chapman," 384; Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. 
Truma� a1!4 American Liberalism (New Yor�. }973), 296-303; McCoy and Ruetten, Quest 
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The economy and equality seemed to off er the keys for "a 
permanent solution for the Indian problem." In the nine­
teenth century Indians had been "segregated" on reservations, 
which at best could provide "an adequate American standard 
of living" for only about half the Indians. Reservation re­
sources should be developed and individual land holding en­
couraged. Forty to fifty percent of the Indians should be 
moved off the reservations, legal distinctions between Indians 
and other citizens abolished, and BIA services transferred to 
the federal, state, and local agencies that provided such pro­
grams for non-Indians. The goal was gradually "to place the 
Indians on exactly the same basis as the rest of the popula­
tion."26 The Fair Deal Indian program was in all essential re­
spects the same as the Eisenhower administration's termination 
policy. 
The major legislative expression of the Fair Deal's gradualist 
phase was the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act, passed in April 
1950 after a severe blizzard threatened to embarrass the 
administration. The act authorized $88.5 million over ten years 
for such projects as irrigation, roads, and schools to lure 
industry to the reservations and for relocation of a thousand 
families in urban areas. The BIA-formulated plan assumed the 
tribes needed and wanted economic development patterned 
after white society, and relied on heavy capital spending and a 
centralized white-staffed organization instead of an indigenous 
structure. For all its seeming modernity, such a program, as 
Monroe E. Price has pointed out, announced a return to 
nineteenth-century concepts of assimilation. Emphasizing jobs 
for individuals instead of wealth for the community, develop­
ment and relocation revived the individualistic ethic. The 
Indian was to become a worker instead of a farmer, but either 
path led to civilization. The Interior Department said as much 
when it lauded the measure as "a long step toward assimila­
tion." Truman hailed the bill as a model for "the complete 
and Response, 304; To Secure These Rights: Repm-t of the President's Committee on Civil Rights 
( N ew York, 1947), 4; A. A. Berle, Jr., "A Liberal Program and Its Philosophy," in 
Seymour E. Harris, ed., Saving American Capitalism: A Liberal Economic Program (New 
York, 1948), esp. 43, 57; N isbet, The Quest forCommunity, 224-228; cf. Linda K. Kerber, 
"The Abolitionist Perception of the I ndian," Journal of American History, LXII (1975), 
290, 295 . 
28"A Permanent Solution for the Indian Problem," n.d. (ca. Dec. 1950), box 58, Official 
File, Harry S. Truman Papers. 
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merger of all Indian groups into the general body of our 
population."27 
But the gradualist ideal withered in the administration of 
Indian affairs from 1 950 through 1952. Oscar Chapman, 
usually considered one of the staunchest liberals in the Tru­
man Cabinet, became Secretary of the Interior on December 1, 
1 949. As Ickes' assistant secretary ,  Chapman had enthusi­
astically supported the Indian New Deal and most other com­
munity New Deal programs. As Krug's under secretary, he 
gradually abandoned most of the community New Deal and 
eased towards Indian assimilation. At his confirmation hear­
ings in January 1950, he assured the assimilationist senator, 
Arthur V. Watkins of Utah: "The Indians should be inter­
mingled gradually and mixed with our people." Two years 
later the gradualness evaporated as the Secretary called for a 
"full-scale drive toward the goal of full independence for the 
Indian people."28 
Chapman shunted Nichols to the sidelines and appointed 
the man he had wanted since 1946, "one of the ablest admin­
istrators in the Federal Service," Dillon S. Myer. The nominee's 
WRA experience convinced Chapman that Myer "combined 
administrative ability with a sympathetic understanding of 
human nature ."  Myer was representative of the professional 
ci vii servant who had gained prominence in the 1930s. He had 
begun his federal service as a county agricultural agent, 
teaching good farmers to become bigger and better farmers, 
and the poorer yeomen to move to the city. He had worked 
through the ranks to become assistant director of the Soil 
Conservation Service, when he was tapped for the WRA 
position. Truman, whose decisiveness Myer praised, had 
named him head of the Federal Housing Administration and 
the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The new commis­
sioner relished his reputation as a man for whom no admin-
" Koppes, " 'Oscar L. Chapman," 47-54; Ward Shepard to Brophy, N ov. 9, 194ti, 
box 8, B rophy Papers ; Monroe E. Price, "Lawyers on the Reservation : Some Implica­
tions for the Legal Pro fession," '  Arizona State Law Journal ( 1969), 184- 185. 
28Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hearings on Nomination of 
Oscar L. Chapman to be Secretary of the Interior, 8 1  Cong., 2 sess. (Jan. I fi, 1950), 12; Senate 
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Interior Department Appmpriations for I 953, 
H.R. 7176, 82 Cong. ,  2 sess. (April H i , 1 952) ,  8; Koppes, "Oscar L. Chapman," 16- 1 7, 
43 - 44 ,  205-2 1 4 .  
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istrative job was too tough: "I never ducked," he boasted. 
His immediate superior, Assistant Secretary of the Interior 
Dale Doty, put it another way: "For Myer everything fit into 
squares."29 
The new commissioner rejected Collier's celebration of In­
dians. Collier had extrapolated from the unique case of the 
Pueblos to Indians at large, he argued. The rest of the tribes, 
which Myer mistakenly believed to have been hunters exclu­
sively, had lost their economy and hence had lost their culture. 
Indians would die out as a separate people. Reservations, how­
ever, thwarted the inevitable by perpetuating "certain old ways 
of life." He saw little but poverty in these traditional ways; his 
public and private statements were all but devoid of apprecia­
tion of Indian culture. Indians presented solely an economic 
problem. Emphasizing the efficient use of taxpayers' dollars, 
he tailored his administration to what he saw as the inevitable 
course of history.30 
Myer almost completely abandoned the gradual approach 
for what he termed "withdrawal programming." He inaugu­
rated a program division that began filling in squares with 
masses of statistics, chiefly economic, to schedule the tribes for 
withdrawal of federal protection and services. Despite much 
confusion and opposition among Indians, Myer ordered with­
drawal programming to proceed at full speed in August 1952, 
"even though Indian cooperation may be lacking in certain 
cases." It made little difference whether tribes had come under 
the Indian Reorganization Act. The Menominee had accepted 
the IRA, the Klamath had not; but Congress terminated both 
during Eisenhower's first term on the basis of plans drawn up 
by Myer's administration.3 1 
The commissioner used his administrative latitude to roll 
back many of the remaining fragments of the Indian New 
" Chapman to Joseph C. ()'Mahoney, April 1 7, 1950, box 1 1 5, Chapman Papers; 
author's interviews with M yer, May 5, 1 975, and Doty, Aug. 2 1 ,  1 973; Koppes, "Oscar 
L. Chapman," 39, 2 1 8 - 224 ;  Myer, "An Autobiography" (Oral history transcript, U ni­
versity of  Cal i fornia, Berkeley, copy,  Truman Library) , 26 1 -297. 
30 Myer,  Autobiography, 2 86; author's interview with Myer, May 5, 1 975. 
31 B IA Commissioner to all bureau officials, Aug. 5, 1 952 , box I ,  Myer Papers, 
Truman Library; Hasse, "Termination and Assimilation ," I 08- 1 64, 222 ; Lurie, 
" M enominee Termination," 33 -43;  Orfield , "A Study of the Termination Policy," 
673-8 1 7. 
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Deal. Since he thought Indians had lost their culture, Myer 
abolished the arts and crafts board. Boarding schools began to 
replace day schools. Myer all but halted the revolving credit 
fund, advising Indians instead to mortgage their individual 
lands and borrow from banks. He abandoned earlier efforts to 
secure native land claims, especially for the Pyramid Lake 
Paiutes in Nevada, and supported an Alaska statehood bill that 
would have extinguished native claims. Disregarding Indian 
opposition, he actively sponsored bills to bring certain tribes 
under state and local laws, moving faster and farther than 
Congress was prepared to do.32 
With one hand Myer reduced federal responsibility; with 
the other he expanded federal control. Increased uniformity 
and rigidity-virtual "administrative privacy"-characterized 
Myer's administrative style. He replaced almost all the remain­
ing key Collier holdovers with former WRA administrators. He 
inserted a level of area offices between the commissioner's suite 
and the local superintendents, ostensibly to decentralize ad­
ministration, but which also had the effect of insulating him 
from tribal consultation. When the Pyramid Lake Paiutes 
sought to remonstrate with him about an adverse decision, he 
refused to approve their using tribal funds to send a protest 
trio to Washington. (The Paiutes pooled personal funds and 
set out from Reno, Nevada, by Greyhound on a trip that lasted 
four days, including a stopover in Chilicothe, Ohio, when the 
bus broke down.) In 1952 Myer sought congressional approval 
of a bill allowing BIA employees to carry firearms and to arrest 
Indians without a warrant, but when even Senator Pat McCar­
ran of Nevada demurred, the bill died.33  
One of Myer's potentially most far-reaching actions was his 
three-year campaign against the Indians' attorneys. He tried to 
impose regulations that would have kept a tribe from hiring an 
attorney until the commissioner agreed the tribe needed a 
32 Koppes, "Oscar L. Chapman," 221- 225; Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs for 1952 (Washington, 0.C. ,  1952),-389-395. 
33 McNickle, Indian Man, 189; Harold Ickes, Diary, Oct. 14 and 20, 1951; Hasse, 
"Termination and Assimilation," 118, 128-129, 144-146; Koppes , "Oscar L. Chap­
man," 221-225. When Chapman heard of the Paiute incident he ordered Myer to 
approve their using tribal funds. 
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lawyer, approved the tribe's choice, and set the attorney's fee. 
Shady dealings characterized too many Indian legal affairs, as 
Myer argued; but since the tribes needed lawyers to combat the 
BIA as much as practically any other adversary, the proposal 
left an aura of the fox guarding the hen yard. After prolonged 
criticism from such organizations as the National Congress of 
American Indians, the Association of American Indian Affairs, 
the American Civil Liberties Union, and the American Bar 
Association, the commissioner grudgingly capitulated.34  
Indians and their defenders raised a chorus of protest 
against Myer's policies. Ickes and Collier again assumed the 
role of anguished critic they had played in the 1920s. "We 
simply must hog tie Myer," Ickes told his former commis­
sioner. The "old curmudgeon" advised Chapman in 195 1 that 
Myer "should be scourged from his office as an unfaithful 
public servant who has been persistently recreant to his trust." 
Near an open break with his erstwhile assistant secretary, Ickes 
appealed personally to Chapman to square his Fair Deal 
performance with his New Deal record. Indians expressed 
nearly unanimous opposition to withdrawal, a surprised Myer 
acknowledged. But he did not moderate his approach; the 
bureau would gladly withdraw its services from any tribe that 
felt the BIA was a hindrance, he said. Even the right of protest 
was converted into a tool to further assimilation.35 
Withdrawal and termination proved disastrous economi­
cally. In a virtual reenactment of the aftermath of the Dawes 
Act, if on a smaller scale, many Indians of terminated tribes 
rapidly lost their land and wound up on welfare rolls. Indians 
who moved to the cities all too often found discrimination and 
unemployment. Moreover, the resurgence, not the disappear­
ance, of Indian culture and community has been one of the 
most salient features of Indian life since World War II. After 
two decades of termination, the Menominee petitioned to have 
34 Koppes, "Oscar L. Chapman," 225-250. 
35 lckes to Collier, Dec. 6, 1950, box 61, Ickes Papers ; Ickes to Chapman, Aug. 30, 
1951, box 4 7, Chapman Papers ; Ickes to Chapman, Sept. 14, 1951, box 6, Doty Papers, 
Truman Library ; Ickes to Secretary of the Interior, Nov. 5,  1951, File 5-6, RG 48; 
Koppes, "Oscar L. Chapman," chaps. 6-7. The Ickes and Collier collections bulge with 
correspondence detailing their opposition to the Chapman-Myer policies and pro­
cedures ; see esp. boxes 61-63, Ickes Papers, and box 34, Collier Papers. 
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their tribal status restored. Scornful of the Indian New Deal 
and the "good, soft-hearted people," Myer and the termi­
nationists proved to be more unrealistic than the "utopians."36 
Indians had fallen victim to a false uniformity. How could 
one oppose the recognition of special group status, as in Nazi 
Germany or in United States Jim Crow laws, but then support 
Indian community? Harold Ickes answered: A ghetto was " a 
segregation along racial lines for the purpose of denying equal 
rights" ; but "a reservation was the setting up of a cooperative 
society for the protection of rights."  Amidiscrimination, vital 
though it was, was not enough. Civil rights laws guaranteed the 
rights of individuals, not groups, and to the extent that civil 
rights encouraged integration and assimilation, they tended to 
weaken community. It was scarcely paradoxical, therefore, that 
Indian rights were badly eroded under the first administration 
to have a civil rights program.37 
The abandonment of the Indian New Deal was representa­
tive of the Truman administration's handling of the com­
munity New Deal. The Truman admin istration made no
attempt to revive the community programs that had died, and
it supervised the dismantling of those, such as parts of the
Farm Security Administration, that remained. Greenbelt towns
had been a characteristic response of the New Deal; com­
munity-destroying urban renewal was emblematic of the Fair 
Deal. In Ickes's old department the balance between conserva­
tion for use and preservation collapsed and dam-building 
developers threatened the integrity of the national parks. The 
Truman administration did preserve and extend some aspects 
of the New Deal, as most overviews of the period contend. 
Alonzo Hamby goes further to argue that, in addition to 
institutionalizing the New Deal, Truman moved liberalism 
36 Hasse, "Termination and Assimilation,' "  276-303 ; Orfield, "A Study of the Ter­
mination Policy , ' "  67'.l-8 1 7; Lurie, " Menominee Termination ,' " :i'.l - cl:l ;  William A .  
B rophy a n d  Sophie Aberle, The Indian: America's Unfinished Business (Nor man, Okla . ,  
1 966) , 1 9 3 - 207.  
37 lckes ,  Diary ,  June 1 0 , 1 950; Price, "Lawyers on the Reservation, ' "  I G9 - I 75 ; Vine 
Deloria, Jr . ,  " I mplications of the 1 968 Civi l  Rights Act in Tribal Autonomy, ' "  in India n  
Voices: The First Convocation of American Indum Scholars (San Francisco. 1 970), 85 - 1 04;  
Mc Williams,  Idea of Fraternity in America, chap.  20. In  the 1 960s I ndians-and,  indeed, a 
chorus of blacks increasingly conscious of their community l ife-began to question 
whether civil rights without an awareness of community were adequate. 
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"beyond the New Deal. " But these extensions tended to be of 
the more individualistic and traditional liberal programs. The 
shifting liberal policies toward community, as embodied in  
Indian administration, suggest that interpretations which 
stress continuity between the New Deal and the Fair Deal 
require important qualifications.38 
The Fair Deal had not abandoned the quest for community, 
but the means of finding community were now very different. 
Indians, like other Americans, were to find community in 
consumerism, as in the "consumption communities" praised by 
Daniel Boorstin, and in various voluntary and usually transient 
associations. Yet the multiplicity and specialization of these 
groups meant that they were drained of the intensity and 
shared values found in community. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 
3'The most comprehensive study of the Truman administration, and the one that 
addresses the question of the continuity of liberalism from New Deal to Fair Deal most 
ful ly ,  is Hamby,  Beyond the New Deal: Harry S.  Truman and American Liberalism (New 
York, 1 973) .  Other overviews which stress continuity include Richard E. Neustadt, 
" From FDR to Tru man : Congress and the Fair Deal," Public Policy, V ( 1 954), 35 1 - 38 1 ;  
Richard Kirkendall, "Harry Truman," in Morton Borden, ed . ,  America's Eleven Greatest 
Presidents ( Rev .  ed. ,  Chicago, 1 97 1 ) , 255 - 288 ;  Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presi­
dency: The History of a Triumphant Succession (New York, 1 966) ; Dewey W. Grantham, The 
United States since 1945: The Ordeal of Power (New York, 1 976),  chap. 3; Eric Goldman, 
The Crucial Decade--and After: America, 1945 - 1 960 (New York, 1 960), 92; Barton J. 
Bernstein,  " America in War and Peace : The Test of Liberalism," in Bernstein ,  ed. ,  
Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New York, 1 969), 289 - 32 1 .  A n  
exception t o  the continuity interpretation i s  Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis 
Presidency (New York, 1 973) .  For assessments of Truman period domestic histori­
ography , see H arvard Sitkoff, "Years of the Locust: I nterpretations of Truman's 
Presidency since 1 965,"  and Hamby, "The Clash of Perspectives and the Need for New 
Syntheses ," both in  Richard Kirkendall, ed . ,  The Truman Period as a Research Field: A 
Reappraisal, 1 972 (Colu mbia, Mo. ,  1 974), 75- 1 45; Richard Polenberg, " Historians and 
the Liberal Presidency : Recent Appraisals of Roosevelt and Truman," South Atlantic 
Quarterly, LXXV ( 1 976), 2 0 - 3 5 ;  and Geoffrey S. Smith, " 'Harry. We Hardly Know 
You': Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1 945 - 1 954," American Political Science Re­
view, LXX ( 1 976) , 568 - 582. Moving away fro m overall i nterpretations, most of which 
em phasize continuity because they repeat familiar social-welfare themes, some incisive 
topical studies call into question the assumptions of New Deal-Fair Deal continuity.  
Two such are Graham, Toward a Planned Society, chap. 3 ,  and Richardson , Dams, Parks & 
Politics, both of which emphasize continuity between Truman and Eisenhower. One of 
the problems in assessing the differences between the New Deal and the Fair Deal is 
that serious work on domestic politics during World War I I  is only beginning. See 
Polenberg, War and Society, chap. 3; John Morton Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics and 
A merirnn Culture during World War II ( N ew York, 1 976), chaps. 7-9; and David Brody,
"The New Deal and World War I I , ' "  i n  John Braemen , Robert H. Bremner, and David 
B rody ,  eds . . The New Deal: The National Level (Columbus, Ohio, 1 975) , 267- 309; and
John A .  Salmond, "Postscript to the New Deal : The Defeat of the Nomination of 
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History, LXI  ( 1 974) , 4 1 7 -436. 
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recognized as much when he devoted the final chapter of his 
apotheosis of midcentury liberalism, The Vital Center, to the 
need for community. He seemed to suggest that individuals 
found community by giving themselves with "passionate in­
tensity" to the nation. National unity and individualism were 
not inconsistent but complementary and tended to produce 
midcentury uniformity and conformism. The vision of John 
Collier and the community New Dealers, which encouraged "a 
sense of variousness and possibility" by posing the community 
between the nation and the individual, was discarded as an 
object of liberal policy. 39 
39Daniel Boorstin,  The Americans: The Democratic Experience ( New York,  1 973), 1 47-
148; Morton Grodzins, The Loyal and the Disloyal: Social Boundaries of Patriotism and 
Treason (Chicago, 1956), 29; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. , The Vital Center (Boston , 
1949), 256; Karl Mannheim , Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning (New York, 1 950), 
10- 12;  Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination (Garden City, N .Y . ,  1 950), xii; Carl J .  
Friedrich, "The Concept o f  Community i n  the History o f  Political and Legal Philos­
ophy," in Friedrich , ed . ,  Community (New York, 1 959), 23. 
